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Abstract
In mobile ad hoc networks, it is usually assumed that all the nodes belong to the same
authority; therefore, they are expected to cooperate in order to support the basic functions of
the network such as routing. In this paper, we consider the case in which each node is its own
authority and tries to maximize the benets it gets from the network. In order to stimulate
cooperation, we introduce a virtual currency and detail the way it can be protected against
theft and forgery. We show that this mechanism fullls our expectations without signicantly
decreasing the performance of the network.
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network is a wireless network formed by some nodes in a self-organized way
without relying on any established infrastructure or centralized administration. Since all services
essential to the operation of the network are assumed to be provided by the nodes themselves,
the functioning of mobile ad hoc networks heavily depends on the cooperative behavior of their
nodes. Communication between two distant nodes A and B, for instance, relies on intermediate
nodes that forward packets for the benet of A and B.
So far, applications of mobile ad hoc networks have been envisioned mainly for crisis situations
(e.g., in the battleeld or in rescue operations). In these applications, all the nodes of the network
belong to a single authority (e.g., a single platoon or rescue team) and have a common goal. For
this reason, the nodes are naturally motivated to cooperate.
However, with the progress of technology, it will soon be possible to deploy mobile ad hoc
networks on a large scale for civilian scenarios as well. Example applications are networks of cars,
and provision of communication facilities in remote areas. In these networks, the nodes typically
do not belong to a single authority (at the very limit, each node belongs to a dierent authority: to
its user) and they do not pursue a common goal. In addition, these networks could be much bigger
and have a longer lifetime, and they could be completely self-organized, meaning that the network
would run solely by the operation of the end-users. In such networks, there is no good reason
to assume that the nodes cooperate and provide services to each other. Indeed, the contrary is
true: service provision is not in the interest of the nodes, because it consumes energy and it does
not have any direct advantages. Note that the nodes of mobile ad hoc networks are often battery
powered, and thus, energy is a precious resource that they may not want to waste for the benet
of other nodes.

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Lack of cooperation may have fatal eects on the operation of the network. As an example, let
us consider Figure 1, which illustrates that the throughput of the network decreases dramatically
as the percentage of the nodes that deny packet forwarding increases. The dierent curves belong
to networks of dierent sizes (100, 200, 300, and 400 nodes) but with the same node density. The
gure also shows that larger networks (those that we are interested in) are more vulnerable to this
kind of misbehavior by the nodes. These results are based on our own simulations described in
detail in Section 4, but similar results have been presented in [11] as well.
Figure 1: The eect of non-cooperating nodes on the throughput
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of non-cooperating nodes in large, self-
organized, mobile ad hoc networks for civilian applications. We assume that each node belongs
to a dierent authority (user), which has full control over the node. In particular, the user can
tamper with the software and the hardware of the node, and modify its behavior in order to
better adapt it to her own goals (e.g., to save battery power). We understand that regular users
usually do not have the required level of knowledge and skills to modify their nodes. Nevertheless,
our assumption is still reasonable, because criminal organizations can have enough interest and
resources to reverse engineer a node and sell tampered nodes with modied behavior on a large
scale.
On the other hand, we assume that users are not interested in altering the low level protocols
of their nodes. These protocols are essential to be able to participate in the network; their
modication would certainly disturb the operation of the network, but it would not provide too
many advantages for the user of the node. To be more precise, we assume that the physical and
data link (MAC) layer of the nodes function correctly, and thus, the nodes are able to directly
communicate with other nodes in their power range. However, we assume that users can modify
all other layers, including the network layer.
This results in a network where nodes are \selsh": they tend to use services provided by other
nodes, but not to provide services for free to the community. In such a network, it is essential to
stimulate the nodes to cooperate. In this paper, we propose an economic approach for this purpose.
We introduce a virtual currency, called nuglets, and mechanisms for charging/rewarding service
usage/provision. Nodes that use a service must pay for it (in nuglets) to nodes that provide the
service. This makes nuglets indispensable for using the network, and thus, each node is interested
in increasing its stock of nuglets. A way to achieve this is to provide services to other nodes
1
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Similar to money in real life, nuglets can be lost. This loss has to be compensated somehow, otherwise the
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Besides stimulating for the provision of services, this mechanism also encourages the users of the
nodes to make a moderate usage of the network, and to keep their devices turned on (so that they
can be used as relays) even if they are not expecting any packet to be sent to them at that time.
In this paper, we focus on the application of nuglets to stimulate the provision of a specic
service: packet forwarding. The present proposal was developed in the framework of the Termin-
odes Project [9, 8, 18]. However, it is generic, and in particular, it could work in conjunction with
any routing algorithm. The results presented here are follow-ups of the results of an earlier paper
[3]. We considerably improved the mechanisms proposed in [3], removed some constraining as-
sumptions, included an economic model of the nodes, and performed appropriate simulations that
demonstrate that the introduction of the nuglets does not signicantly decrease the performance
of the network.
The outline of the paper is the following: In Section 2, we introduce charging models for the
packet forwarding service. One of the models is discussed further in Section 3, where we propose
some extensions to it. In Section 4, we describe our simulations and present the results that we
obtained. We propose security mechanisms to protect the investigated charging model in Section 5,
and report on related work in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Basic charging models for packet forwarding
Packet forwarding is a service provided by intermediate nodes to the source and the destination
of the packet. Therefore, either the source or the destination should pay for it. In this section,
we present two conceptual models for charging for the packet forwarding service. In the rst one,
called Packet Purse Model, the source of the packet is charged, whereas in the second one, called
Packet Trade Model, the destination is charged. The two models can also be combined to provide
a hybrid solution.
2.1 The Packet Purse Model (PPM)
In this model, the source of the packet pays for the packet forwarding service. The service charge
is distributed among the forwarding nodes in the following way: When sending the packet, the
source loads it with a number of nuglets sucient to reach the destination. Each forwarding node
acquires some nuglets from the packet that covers its forwarding costs. The exact number of
nuglets charged by the forwarding nodes may depend on many things, including the amount of
energy used for the forwarding operation, the current battery status of the forwarding node, and
its current number of nuglets. If a packet does not have enough nuglets to be forwarded, then it
is discarded.
The main advantage of this model is that, besides stimulating cooperation, it may also deter
nodes from sending useless data and overloading the network. Prevention of overloading is an
important issue, since, as mentioned in [7], the available bandwidth per node declines when the
number of nodes increases (assuming that the trac does not exhibit locality properties).
The main disadvantage is that it is dicult to estimate the number of nuglets that are required
to reach a given destination. If the source under-estimates this number, then the packet will be
discarded, and the source loses its investment in this packet. Therefore, the source should over-
estimate the number. The surplus that remains in the packet when it arrives to the destination
can be kept by the destination, or if the destination provides information services, it can be used
to pay for these. However, the source should be careful with the over-estimation, because packets
(with nuglets inside) can be lost during transit due to several reasons (e.g., buer overow at
forwarding nodes).
system becomes poorer and poorer. One way to solve this problem is to let users buy nuglets for real money.
Nuglets can be created by international treaty organizations and their agencies. This would mean that providing
services is, actually, not the only way to earn nuglets. However, it can be made the preferred way by appropriately
choosing the price of one nuglet.
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2.2 The Packet Trade Model (PTM)
In this approach, the packet does not carry nuglets, but it is traded for nuglets by intermediate
nodes. Each intermediary \buys" it from the previous one for some nuglets (except for the rst
intermediary that receives the packet for free from the source), and \sells" it to the next one (or
to the destination) for more nuglets. In this way, each intermediary that provided a service by
forwarding the packet, increases its number of nuglets, and the total cost of forwarding the packet
is covered by the destination of the packet. If the next intermediary does not want to buy the
packet for the given price, then the forwarding intermediary may try to sell it for a lower price,
or to another intermediary, or it may drop the packet.
An advantage of this approach is that the source does not have to know in advance the number
of nuglets required to deliver a packet. Furthermore, letting the destination pay for the packet
forwarding makes this approach applicable in case of multicast packets as well. A serious dis-
advantage is that this approach for charging does not directly deter nodes from overloading the
network.
2.3 A hybrid model
The previous two models can be combined in the following way: The source loads the packet with
some nuglets before sending it. The packet is handled according to the Packet Purse Model until it
runs out of nuglets. Then it is handled according to the Packet Trade Model until the destination
buys it.
This approach combines the advantages of the Packet Purse and Packet Trade Models: First,
since the source still has to pay, it will try to avoid sending useless trac and overloading the
network. Second, the source can under-estimate the number of nuglets that it puts in the packet,
because the packet is not discarded when it runs out of nuglets.
2.4 Protection of the models
Clearly, the models described above must be secured and protected against various attacks. An
important general problem to solve is the prevention of nuglet forgery. Further problems in the
Packet Purse Model include the protection of the packet purse from illegal modications during
transit; preventing the detachment of a packet purse from its original packet and the re-use of
it with another packet; and ensuring that the forwarding node receives the service charge if, and
only if, it really forwards the packet. A similar problem in the Packet Trade Model is to ensure
that the forwarding node receives the payment from the next hop if, and only if, the next hop
receives the packet. We will address most of these problems in Section 5. For now, let us assume
that these problems are solved and the models are protected in some way or another.
3 Extensions to the basic Packet Purse Model
In the rest of the paper, we are exclusively concerned with the Packet Purse Model. In the
presentation of the basic model, we left open the dicult question of how to control the number of
nuglets that are taken out from the packet by the forwarding nodes. We assume that a forwarding
node can determine the minimum number of nuglets it needs to forward the packet. Ideally, this
number should depend on the amount of energy to be used for the forwarding operation (i.e.,
nodes that forward the packet to a more remote neighbor should acquire more nuglets), the status
of the battery at the forwarding node (i.e., nodes which have low battery may esteem battery
power higher and should acquire more nuglets as a compensation for the energy used), and maybe
some other factors. Clearly, the node should demand this or a higher amount of nuglets from
the packet. But what prevents a node from demanding the whole content of the packet purse of
a packet? In order to solve this problem, we propose the following two extensions to the basic
Packet Purse Model:
4
 PPM with Fixed Per Hop Charges: A simple approach is the following: The source of
the packet determines a xed per hop charge u before sending the packet, and puts u in the
packet besides the nuglets. A protection mechanism (discussed later in Section 5) ensures
that each forwarding node acquires exactly u nuglets for the forwarding operation. Thus, in
this approach, the reward for packet forwarding does not depend on the amount of energy
used, the status of the battery, or any other factor. However, the forwarding node is allowed
to drop the packet if it estimates that forwarding would not be benecial for u nuglets.
 PPM with Auctions: In this extension of the Packet Purse Model, each forwarding node
(and also the source) runs a sealed bid second price auction to determine the next hop.
The bidders are the potential next hops towards the destination of the packet. Each bidder
b
i
determines a price p
i
, for which it is willing to forward the packet, and sends it to
the forwarding node in a sealed form. When the forwarding node receives all the bids, it
determines the winner of the auction. The winner is the bidder b
j
with the lowest bid
2
p
j
= min
i
p
i
(if there are more, then one is chosen randomly or according to some other
criteria). Let the second lowest bid be p
k
= min
i; i6=j
p
i
. The forwarding node puts the
value of p
k
in the packet, and sends it to b
j
. A protection mechanism (discussed later in
Section 5) ensures that b
j
acquires p
k
nuglets (p
k
 p
j
) if it forwards the packet further.
A remarkable feature of the second price auction is that if a bidder values the object on
sale at v, then it is a dominant strategy for him to bid exactly v [6]. In our case, this
means that each (rational) bidding node is encouraged to bid the smallest price for which
it is still worth for it to forward the packet (i.e., to behave correctly and demand a honest
service charge). We should note that here we assume that the bidders do not collude and
they have no information about the total number of bidders participating in the auction.
In particular, a bidding node does not know whether it is alone or there are other bidders
around competing for the same packet.
The two approaches described above address the same problem of controlling the number of
nuglets that forwarding nodes can take out from the packet in dierent ways. In the rst approach
the source xes this number before sending the packet. In the second approach, this number is
determined hop-by-hop by running a second price auction among some neighbors of the forwarding
node.
The rst approach has two main advantages: rst, it is very simple to implement; and second,
it is generic, and it can easily be added to any existing routing algorithm, such as DSR [10] or
AODV [13]. A disadvantage is that it is not very exible: if there is a forwarding node on the
route that demands more nuglets than the xed per hop charge in the packet, then the packet is
dropped, although it may contain much more nuglets than the demand. We note, however, that
in many ad hoc routing algorithms there is a route discovery mechanism, which could be used
to obtain information about the \greediness" of the nodes on various possible routes towards the
destination. This may help the source to x a per hop charge and select the least expensive route.
In addition, each node is interested in participating in the route discovery and honestly reporting
on the charge it demands, because otherwise, if it does not participate or lies, the source may
select a route that does not go through the node, or x a per hop charge that is not benecial for
the node. This means that the node will not be able to earn nuglets.
The second approach is more complex, because it requires each forwarding node to run an
auction among some of its neighbors. This could be based on message exchanges between the
forwarding node and the bidding neighbors, but this would mean a considerable overhead both in
terms of bandwidth and latency. An alternative approach based on software agents could work
in the following way: Each node sends an agent to its neighbors that represents the node at the
2
Auctions are normally used to sell an object, and for this reason, the bidder with the highest bid is selected as
winner. In our model, the auction is used to buy the service provided by the nodes, and therefore, the bidder who
is willing to provide the service for the smallest charge is selected as winner. This modication does not change the
properties of the second price auction in our model, because we consistently reversed every rule (e.g., in our model,
the winner earns the value of the second lowest bid, while in the standard second price auction the winner has to
pay the value of the second highest bid).
5
neighbors and implements the algorithm that the node would use in the auctions. A forwarding
node then runs the auction locally among the agents of the appropriate neighbors. Finally, the
packet is sent to the owner of the winning agent.
Another disadvantage of the second approach is that it can only be combined with routing
algorithms in which the nodes are allowed to have multiple entries with dierent next hops for the
same destination in their routing tables (e.g., TORA [12]). In these algorithms, forwarding nodes
can use the PPM with Auctions to select the actual next hop from the list of available next hops.
The advantage of the second approach is that in each forwarding step, the node that demands
the lowest charge is selected as next hop, and in this way, this approach tries to minimize the
number of nuglets spent during the delivery of packets. Intuitively, this decreases the probability
that a packet will be dropped because it runs out of nuglets. Furthermore, it is reasonable for the
nodes to make the number of nuglets that they charge for the forwarding operation dependent on
their battery status. In particular, a node that has a shortage of battery may esteem battery power
higher and should demand more nuglets for the compensation of the energy spent for forwarding.
In this way, however, the node decreases its chances to win auctions and forward packets. This is
a nice property, because, as it is pointed out in [5], the lifetime of the network can be lengthened
by routing the trac in such a way that the energy consumption is balanced among the nodes in
proportion to their energy reserves.
4 Simulation
In order to see the eects of the introduction of the proposed charging models on the performance
of the ad hoc network, we conducted appropriate simulations written in plain C++ language. Our
goal was to study the overall behavior of the mechanism and to show that the performance of the
network does not decrease signicantly. Our simulation results show that this is indeed true.
4.1 Simulation description
The basis of our simulations is a geodesic packet forwarding algorithm developed in the context of
the Terminodes Project [8]. However, we considerably simplied the original algorithm described
in [2] in order to ease the implementation of its simulator. This does not aect our results, since
we are not interested in the performance of the packet forwarding algorithm itself, but rather in
the extent to which this performance changes when we extend the algorithm with our charging
models.
The simplied geodesic packet forwarding algorithm that we use works in the following way:
We assume that each node knows its own geographic position and the geographic positions of
each of its neighbors. Furthermore, the source of a packet knows the geographic position of the
destination. Before sending the packet, the source puts the coordinates of the destination in the
header of the packet. Then, it determines which of its neighbors is the closest to the destination,
and sends the packet to this neighbor. Since the packet contains the coordinates of the destination,
each forwarding node can perform the same operation, and sends the packet to the neighbor which
is the closest to the destination. If the forwarding node does not have any neighbor that is closer
to the destination than the node itself, then the packet is dropped.
We simulated this simplied geodesic packet forwarding algorithm, and its extensions with the
PPM with Fixed Per Hop Charges and the PPM with Auctions. In the rst extension, the xed
per hop charge depends on the number of nuglets that the source itself would need to forward
the packet to the maximum distance in its power range. This number is determined using the
economic model of the nodes presented later in this subsection. The number of nuglets that the
source loads in the packet depends on the estimated number of hops towards the destination and
the xed per hop charge.
In the extension with the PPM with Auctions, the participants (bidders) of the auction are
(the agents of) those neighbors that are closer to the destination of the packet than the forwarding
node is (Figure 2). The behavior of (the agents of) the nodes in the auctions is determined by the
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economic model of the nodes presented later in this subsection. The number of nuglets that the
source loads in the packet depends on the estimated number of hops towards the destination and
the result of the auction run by the source when sending the packet.
forwarding
node
destination
bidders
pow
er r
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e
Figure 2: Geodesic packet forwarding with the PPM with Auctions
In the simulations, we modeled the economic behavior of the nodes in the following way: Each
node has a battery utility function u and a nuglet utility function v. In our model, the utility of
battery for a node depends on the battery level b of the node and the number n of its nuglets in
the following way:
u(b; n) = k
min(n

; N

)
min(b

; B

)
where , , k, N , and B are appropriate constants, and ;  > 0. It can be seen from the
expression that if the battery level b of the node is below a given threshold B, then battery utility
increases as the battery level decreases. If the battery level of the node is above this threshold, then
the battery utility is constant and does not depend on the battery level of the node. Furthermore,
battery utility is proportional to the number of nuglets if this number is below another threshold
N . This is reasonable, because if the node has a very small number of nuglets, then it cannot send
any packets even if it has enough battery power, and thus, the utility of its battery is low.
Similarly to battery utility, nuglet utility depends on the number n of the node's nuglets and
its battery level b:
v(n; b) =
~
k
min(b
~
;
~
B
~
)
min(n
~

;
~
N
~

)
where ~,
~
,
~
k,
~
N , and
~
B are appropriate constants, and ~;
~
 > 0.
Nodes make their decisions based on their utility functions. Let us assume that a node is
about to forward a packet, and the cost (in terms of battery power used) of this operation would
be c. Let us further assume that the node is oered p nuglets as a reward for the forwarding
operation. The node accepts the oer and forwards the packet, if this results in a positive payo,
which means that p v(n; b)  c u(b; n) > 0. Since in our simulation the number of nuglets is always
a non-negative integer, the minimum number p
0
of nuglets for which it is still benecial for the
node to forward the packet is:
p
0
=
(
c
u(b;n)
v(n;b)
+ 1 if c
u(b;n)
v(n;b)
is an integer
l
c
u(b;n)
v(n;b)
m
otherwise
In the simulations, the parameters of the economic model are set in the following way:  =
~ = 1,  =
~
 = 0:5, B =
~
B = 20 (the value that corresponds to the full battery is 100), and
N =
~
N = 1000000. k and
~
k are set in such a way that p
0
= 1 whenever n > 1000000, b > 20,
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and c is the cost of transmitting a full sized packet with a full rate to a maximum distance in the
power range.
The simulated networks are composed of 400 nodes that are placed randomly (uniformly)
on a 1000 m  1000 m torus (in order to eliminate border eects). The nodes do not move.
Each node has the same power range of 100 m. Each node generates packets with the rate of
0.5 packet/second. The destination of the packet is chosen randomly (uniformly). The packet
size is 4000 bits in the case of the basic geodesic packet forwarding algorithm, and 4400 bits in
the extensions, in order to represent the overhead due to the additional information in the packet
(e.g., nuglets, per hop charge, etc.). The transmission rate is 1 Mb/s. Battery consumption of
the nodes is such that starting with a full battery, they can send full size packets with full rate
(1 Mb/s) to a maximum distance (100 m) for 1 hour. Battery consumption is proportional to the
square of the distance covered by the transmission. The initial value of the nuglet counters is set
at 800000.
We varied the initial level of the batteries among 80%, 50%, 20%, 15%, 10%, and 5%. For
each battery level and each packet forwarding algorithm, we ran 10 simulations and calculated the
average of the results. In each case, we simulated about 2.5 hours of operation of the network.
4.2 Simulation results
Figure 3 shows the cumulative throughput of the network for the three packet forwarding algo-
rithms when the operation of the network is started at various initial battery levels (80%, 50%,
20%, 15%, 10%, and 5%). Throughput is dened as the ratio between the number of successfully
delivered packets and the total number of packets sent. As expected, both extensions perform
worse than the basic, nuglet-less geodesic packet forwarding algorithm, since in the extensions,
packets are bigger in size, and they can also be dropped by forwarding nodes due to the low value
of the packet purse or the xed per hop charge. However, except for very low battery levels,
the dierence among the performances of the three algorithms is not signicant (less than 5%).
Moreover, again except for low battery levels, the dierence between the performances of the basic
geodesic packet forwarding algorithm and its extension with the PPM with Auctions is negligible
(less than 1%).
Figure 3: Throughput at various battery levels
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5 Protection mechanisms
The rst question to be answered when implementing any of the charging models described in
Section 2 is how to represent nuglets. One possibility would be to represent them as digital coins.
The main problem of this solution is that it requires an authority (usually referred to as the
bank in the literature on digital money) that issues the coins and maintains accounts for the users.
Furthermore, digital coin proposals also make use of on-line or o-line payment gateways, which are
servers through which users perform transactions with the bank. However, self-organized mobile
ad hoc networks should not rely on any established infrastructure and central administration.
Therefore, the digital coin approach does not seem to be appropriate for our purposes.
Instead of using coins, we represent nuglets by counters in the nodes. Each node has a nuglet
counter, the value of which corresponds to the wealth of the node. However, in order to prevent the
node from illegitimately increasing its own counter, we require that the counter is maintained by a
trusted and tamper resistant hardware module in each node. We call this module security module.
The packet purse (i.e., the nuglets that are loaded in the packet) is protected from illegitimate
modication and detachment from its original packet by cryptographic mechanisms.
In order to ensure that the node acquires the nuglets from the packet if, and only if, it really
forwards the packet, the security module requires an acknowledgement from the next hop before
it increases the nuglet counter of the node. The next hop is encouraged to send acknowledgements
by tipping it a few nuglets.
5.1 Assumptions
Before going into the details of our implementation of the Packet Purse Model, we summarize our
main assumptions.
 Security module. As we mentioned before, we require that each node is equipped with a
trusted and tamper resistant hardware module, which we call security module. This module
maintains the nuglet counter of the node and manages some cryptographic parameters (keys)
that are used in the protocols presented later. In case of the PPM with Auctions, the security
module hosts the software agents of the neighboring nodes, and runs the routing algorithm.
We assume that the security modules are manufactured by a limited number of trusted
manufacturers. Furthermore, since the security module is tamper resistant, its behavior
cannot be modied. Therefore, security modules are trusted for always functioning correctly.
One can imagine a security module as a security co-processor, which contains the processor
itself, some memory, battery, and tamper detection circuitry. For more information on
tamper resistant modules, we refer to [14, 1].
 Public key infrastructure. We use public key cryptography to establish symmetric session
keys between security modules of neighboring nodes. These session keys, in turn, are used
for hop-by-hop cryptographic protection of the packet purses and acknowledgements.
We assume that each security module has a private key and a corresponding public key. The
private key is stored in the security module and kept secret. The public key is certied by
the manufacturer of the security module and the certicate is stored in the security module.
In addition, we assume that the manufacturers cross-certify the public keys of each other,
and each security module stores the public key certicates of all manufacturers issued by the
manufacturer of the security module. Finally, we assume that each security module stores an
authentic copy of the public key of its manufacturer, which is loaded in the module securely
at manufacturing time. Note that storing all these certicates is feasible, because we limited
the number of manufacturers.
In this system, each security module can easily obtain the authentic public key of any other
security module in the network. Let us suppose, for instance, that A wants to obtain the
public key of B. B can simply send its public key certicate to A, who can verify it with the
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public key of the manufacturer of B. A possesses an authentic copy of this public key, since
it stores the public key certicates of all manufacturers issued by its own manufacturer, and
an authentic copy of the public key of its own manufacturer.
Our system is a rather pragmatic solution for the reliable distribution of public keys and we
had to limit the number of manufacturers in order for it to work. The design of a general
purpose public key infrastructure for large, self-organized ad hoc networks is an interesting
and non-trivial problem that is beyond the scope of this paper. An approach towards the
solution of this problem is described in [16].
 Tracking of neighbors. We assume that the neighborhood of a node does not change very
fast. This makes it feasible for the node to keep track of its neighbors by running a hello
protocol at regular time intervals. Besides discovering its neighbors, the security module uses
the hello protocol to establish and maintain security associations with the security modules
of the neighboring nodes.
 Acknowledgements. We assume that the data link (MAC) layer uses acknowledgements
in order to make the communication between neighboring nodes reliable. This assumption is
reasonable, since the nodes communicate via unreliable wireless links, and without hop-by-
hop acknowledgements the end-to-end probability of losing a packet would be high, especially
in large networks. Note that IEEE 802.11, the most commonly assumed MAC layer in mobile
ad hoc networks, also uses acknowledgements.
5.2 The security module
The security module is the heart of our protection mechanism. It is the only part of the node
that we can trust for correct behavior. This trust is based on the assumptions that the security
module is manufactured by a trusted manufacturer and it is tamper resistant.
As we mentioned before, we assume that the security module is implemented as a security
co-processor. This means that one cannot put every function at will in the security module.
Actually, one should put as little as possible in it, in order to rely on as few assumptions as
possible. Therefore, our design principle is the following: we implement a few, critical functions
in the security module, and the majority of the functions in the node itself, in such a way that
tampering the latter functions does not give any advantages to the user of the node.
The security module stores the following long term data: a system-wide unique identier of
the module; the nuglet counter of the node; the private key of the security module; the public key
certicate of the security module issued by the manufacturer of the security module; the public
key certicates of all manufacturers issued by the manufacturer of the security module; and the
public key of the manufacturer of the security module.
In addition, the security module maintains a table in which each entry corresponds to a neigh-
boring security module and consists of the following elds:
 Identier. The security module stores the system-wide unique identier of the neighboring
security module.
 Session key. When the node of this security module A and the node of another security
module B become neighbors, they run the hello protocol. Using the hello protocol, A and
B establish a symmetric session key k
AB
. This session key is used to protect the packet
purses and acknowledgments that A and B send to each other. This protection is based on
symmetric key cryptography for eciency reasons. The establishment of the session key, on
the other hand, is based on public key cryptography and uses the aforementioned public key
infrastructure. Clearly, this mechanism can be used to provide other security functions as
well (e.g., link-by-link condentiality and integrity protection of the content of the packets).
 Sequence numbers. Besides the session key, A andB set up sending and receiving sequence
numbers, which are used to detect replayed packet purses. A's sending sequence number
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associated with B is denoted by c
A!B
and the corresponding receiving sequence number is
denoted by c
A B
. B has similar numbers c
B!A
and c
B A
, which are associated with A. A
and B initialize their receiving sequence numbers to random values and use the hello protocol
to set their sending sequence numbers such that the following holds: c
A!B
= c
B A
+1 and
c
B!A
= c
A B
+ 1. Then, each time A sends a packet purse to B, it includes the current
value of its sending sequence number c
A!B
in the purse, and then increments the number.
When A receives a purse from B, it veries whether it contains a sequence number that is
greater by one than its current receiving sequence number c
A B
. If so, then it accepts the
purse and increases its receiving sequence number to the received value, otherwise it rejects
the purse.
 Debt counter. Finally, A maintains a counter d
A!B
associated with B, which holds the
value of A's debt to B. This counter is needed for the following reason: When the node
of A forwards a packet to the node of B, A does not increase the nuglet counter at once,
but waits for an acknowledgement from B, in order to be sure that the packet has really
been forwarded. To stimulate the node of B for sending acknowledgements, A tips it a few
nuglets by increasing d
A!B
(and decreasing its own nuglet counter accordingly) when the
acknowledgement arrives. Since the acknowledgement is much smaller than a normal packet,
the value of the tip is just a small fraction of the reward for forwarding a normal packet. A
and B clear their debts at regular time intervals using the hello protocol, which they run
regularly to maintain their association.
In case of the PPM with Auctions, the security module also hosts the software agents of the
neighboring nodes that participate in the auctions. These agents are exchanged and their states
are updated using the hello protocol. Furthermore, the security module stores routing information,
the exact form of which depends on the actual routing algorithm used.
5.3 Packet purse and acknowledgement format
According to the Packet Purse Model, each packet has to carry some nuglets that are required
to forward the packet. These nuglets are stored in the Packet Purse Header (PPH), which is
an additional header between the MAC Layer Header and the Network Layer Header as it is
illustrated in Figure 4. The PPH is created by the security module of the source and re-computed
by the security module of each forwarding node. It is cryptographically protected in order to
prevent nuglet forgery and other illegitimate modications during transit.
The PPH contains the identier of the security module A that computed it, the identier of
the security module B of the intended next hop, the sending sequence number c
A!B
, the number
of nuglets n in the packet, the number of nuglets u that B is allowed to take out from the purse,
and a Purse Authentication Code (PAC), which is computed from the elds of the PPH and the
cryptographic hash value of the content of the packet using a keyed cryptographic hash function
g with the session key k
AB
between A and B. In case of the PPM with Fixed Per Hop Charges,
u is the xed per hop charge, whereas in case of the PPM with Auctions, u is a value determined
by the result of the auction run by A. The PAC allows B to detect illegitimate modications of
the PPH or the detachment of the PPH from the original packet.
When a node receives a forwarded packet from another node, it must send an acknowledgement.
The Acknowledgement (ACK) is computed by the security module B of the node and it is piggy-
backed on the MAC layer acknowledgement that the node sends to the sender of the packet anyway.
The ACK contains the identier of the security module A of the previous hop, the identier of
B, the sending sequence number c
A!B
that was received in the PPH, and an Acknowledgement
Authentication Code (AAC) that is computed from the received PPH using a keyed cryptographic
hash function g, where the key is the session key k
AB
between A and B.
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PAC - Purse Authentication Code
idA idB n PACucA->BPPH:
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cA->B
- identifier of A (the security module of the forwarding node)
- identifier of B (the security module of the intended next hop)
- A's sending sequence number associated with B
n
u
- number of nuglets
- per hop charge
idA idB AACcA->BACK:
Figure 4: The Packet Purse Header (PPH) and the Acknowledgement (ACK)
5.4 Packet forwarding protocol
What follows is the description of the packet forwarding protocol when the PPM with Fixed Per
Hop Charges is used. At the end of this subsection, we will summarize how packet forwarding in
the PPM with Auctions diers from this.
The packet forwarding protocol is illustrated in Figure 5. Let us assume that node N
B
received
a packet from node N
A
, determined that the next hop is N
C
, and is willing to forward the packet
for the per hop charge in the PPH. In order to acquire any nuglets from the packet, N
B
must
pass the PPH to its security module B together with the identier of the security module C of
the next hop and the cryptographic hash value of the content of the packet.
3
NB
B
1
idC, PPH,
h(Network PDU)
2
PPH'
7
ACK
nB = nB + u8
NC
C
4
PPH'
5
ACK
6
MAC' Network PDUPPH'
MAC'' ACK
MAC Network PDUPPH
from NA
Figure 5: The packet forwarding protocol
B rst veries the PPH by checking if the sending sequence number in the PPH is greater by
one than its receiving sequence number c
B A
associated with A. If so, then this PPH is not a
replay (i.e., it has not yet been processed by B), and B proceeds by setting c
B A
to the received
sequence number value. B also veries the authenticity of the PPH by re-computing the Purse
Authentication Code and comparing the computed value to the received one. If they match, then
it knows that the PPH has indeed been created by A and has not been modied.
After successful verication, B calculates a new PPH by including the identiers of B and C,
and the sending sequence number c
B!C
; decreasing the number of nuglets in the PPH by the
xed per hop charge; and computing the new Purse Authentication Code using the cryptographic
hash function g and the session key k
BC
. Then, B increases its sending sequence number c
B!C
.
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Finally, B stores the new PPH internally, and outputs a copy for N
B
.
N
B
attaches the new PPH to the packet and sends it to N
C
. N
C
must acknowledge the
reception of the packet. For this purpose, N
C
passes the PPH to its security module C, which
constructs the ACK, and returns it to N
C
. N
C
then sends the ACK to N
B
piggy-backed on the
MAC layer acknowledgement.
When N
B
receives the ACK, it passes it to its security module B. B tries to nd the corre-
sponding PPH in its internal memory by matching the identier of C and the sending sequence
number received in the ACK to the identiers and sending sequence numbers in the stored, pend-
ing PPHs. If B nds the corresponding PPH, then it veries the authenticity of the ACK by
re-computing the Acknowledgement Authentication Code from the PPH and comparing it to the
value received in the ACK. If they are equal, then B increases its nuglet counter by the per hop
charge xed in the PPH, and deletes the PPH from its internal memory. It also tips N
C
some
small number of nuglets by increasing the debt counter d
B!C
and decreasing its nuglet counter
accordingly.
In case of the PPM with Auctions, the security module of the forwarding node determines
the next hop, therefore, when the node wants to forward a packet, it only has to pass the PPH
and the hash of the content of the packet to its security module. The security module runs the
auction among the software agents of the potential next hops internally, and constructs the new
PPH according to the result of the auction. Then, it outputs the new PPH and the identier of
the next hop, and the node forwards the packet. The rest of the protocol is the same as in the
case of the PPM with Fixed Per Hop Charges.
5.5 Robustness
The protection mechanism described above is robust and resists against various attacks. Nuglet
forgery is prevented, because it would require either an illegitimate increase of the nuglet counter,
or the generation of fake packet purses or acknowledgements. The former is impossible, because the
nuglet counter is manipulated by the security module, which functions correctly and its behavior
cannot be altered. The latter is prevented by the use of cryptographic checksums (i.e., the PAC
and the AAC), which can be computed correctly only by the security module. The PAC also
protects the integrity of the PPH during transit. Furthermore, the PPH cannot be detached
from the packet and re-used with another one, because the calculation of the PAC involves the
cryptographic hash value of the content of the packet. Replay of the packet purse is prevented
by the use of an ever increasing sequence number that is placed in the purse. This solution is
preferable to the application of time-stamps, because it does not require the security module to
rely on an internal physical clock and to run clock synchronization protocols, which would need
to be secured as well.
5.6 Overhead
At rst sight, our protection mechanisms may seem to add a signicant computational overhead
to the system. But this overhead is small when compared to all the functions that are required to
accomplish packet forwarding. In particular, the calculation and verication of the PPH and the
ACK require only cryptographic hash function computations, which can be done very eciently.
Public key cryptographic operations are used only rarely (only in the hello protocol). Moreover,
most of the processing load will be supported by the security module; to some extent, it can be
accomplished in parallel with the processing performed by the main processor of the node. Finally,
as mentioned in [15], the energy required to perform computation is negligible when compared to
the energy required to perform transmission.
Another issue is the communication overhead represented by the length of the PPH and the
ACK. Assuming that the identiers of the security modules are 8 bytes long, the sending sequence
numbers are 4 bytes long, the nuglets and the per hop charges are represented on 4 and 2 bytes,
respectively, and the authentication codes are 20 bytes long, we get that the PPH is 46 bytes long
(hence the 400 bits overhead in the packets in the simulator described in the previous section),
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and the ACK is 40 bytes long. Considering the usual size of payloads in wireless networks, this
seems to be an acceptable overhead.
6 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the only papers addressing the problem of misbehaving nodes are
[11] and our previous paper [3]. The authors of [11] consider the case in which some malicious
nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so. In order to cope with this problem, they propose
two mechanisms: a watchdog, in charge of identifying the misbehaving nodes, and a pathrater, in
charge of dening the best route avoiding these nodes.
The paper shows that these two mechanisms make it possible to maintain the total throughput
of the network at an acceptable level, even in the presence of a high amount of misbehaving nodes.
However, the operation of the watchdog is based on an assumption that is not always true (as
reckoned by the authors): the promiscuous mode of the wireless interface. Another problem is that
the selshness of the nodes does not seem to be castigated; on the contrary, by the combination
of the watchdog and the pathrater, the misbehaving nodes will not be bothered by the transit
trac while still enjoying the possibility to send and to receive packets. The proposed mechanisms
could be enriched in such a way that a misbehaving node would be locked out by its neighbors.
However, this possibility itself could be exploited to mount denial of service attacks.
Compared to our approach, this proposal exhibits the advantage of being easier to implement,
as it does not require a currency, and therefore, it is independent of any cryptographic function.
However, our approach achieves more: not only does it foster cooperation, but in addition, it
prevents overloading. Moreover, the concept of currency can be used to reward more sophisticated
services that go beyond simple packet forwarding.
In the Internet, proposals similar to ours have been made, in which the users who benet from
a given service remunerate the users who provide that service. A recent example is MojoNation
[17], which is focused on Web publishing and named after the virtual currency it uses (the Mojo).
MojoNation members acquire Mojos by contributing resources (e.g., disk space or CPU time) to
the community, or performing services (e.g., hosting a tracking or relay service), and they can use
their Mojos to browse and download the content (e.g., MP3 les) available within MojoNation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated how the cooperation of nodes in self-organized mobile ad hoc net-
works { notably the willingness to forward packets for the benet of others { can be stimulated by
introducing a virtual currency (nuglets) in the system. Besides stimulating cooperation, nuglets
are a way to encourage the user to make a moderate usage of the network, and to keep her device
turned on (so that it can be used as a relay) even if she is not expecting any packet to be sent to
her at that time.
We discussed possible charging models for packet forwarding, and described the economic
model that we used in our simulations. We also detailed the way the exchange of nuglets can be
protected against fraud. We studied the behavior of networks in three cases: i) without nuglets
ii) with nuglets and xed per hop charges and iii) with nuglets and per hop charges based on
auctions. Our results show that the introduction of the nuglets does not signicantly decrease the
performance of the network. We pointed out that the Packet Purse Model with Fixed Per Hop
Charges can easily be integrated with any existing routing protocol such as DSR or AODV.
We believe that introducing a kind of virtual currency can serve several other purposes in
mobile ad hoc networks. First, it can be used to remunerate not only communication services,
as described in this paper, but also information services. Second, it can be used as a way to
pay for the usage of backbones or satellite links, when a node has to communicate with a very
distant party. In this case, the virtual currency will have to be converted in some way into \hard"
currency.
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In terms of future work, we intend to study the proposed mechanism when integrated with a
mainstream routing protocol (e.g., DSR or AODV) and to simulate it under ns; we do not expect
important dierences with the results obtained so far, however. We also intend to explore possible
approaches for the estimation of the initial packet purse by the source of the packet, and we will
work on techniques aimed at compensating the overall loss of nuglets due to packet dropping.
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